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Abstract
In this paper we present a transformation of
finite propositional default theories into so-
called propositional argumentation systems.
This transformation allows to characterize all
notions of Reiter’s default logic in the frame-
work of argumentation systems. As a conse-
quence, computing extensions, or determin-
ing wether a given formula belongs to one
extension or all extensions can be answered
without leaving the field of classical proposi-
tional logic. The transformation proposed is
linear in the number of defaults.
Keywords: Default Logic, Argumentation Systems,
Embedding, Propositional Logic.
1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 MOTIVATION, CONTRIBUTION AND
OUTLOOK
Reiter’s default logic (Reiter 1980) is at once the most
popular and the most controversial non-monotonic for-
malism dealing with uncertain information. Popular,
because knowledge can be represented in a natural way
in default logic. Controversial, because the concept of
an extension as presented by Reiter is quite complex.
Since default logic has been presented (Reiter 1980)
a lot of effort took place to establish relationships
between default logic and other non-monotonic for-
malisms, such as autoepistemic logic (Konolige 1988)
and circumscription (Lifschitz 1990).
Poole (Poole 1988) (Theorist) was — to our knowl-
edge — the first one who tried to embed Re-
iter’s default logic in an assumption-based frame-
work (De Kleer 1986a; De Kleer 1986b; Forbus and
de Kleer 1993; Kean and Tsiknis 1992; Kean and
Tsiknis 1993). It turned out that his proposition de-
rives more extensions than the original default the-
ory allows. The transformation proposed by Ben-
Eliyahu & Dechter (Ben-Eliyahu and Dechter 1996)
(meta-interpretations) results in a one-to-one corre-
spondence of the original default theory and the their
constructed propositional theory, but their transfor-
mation is in general is NP-complete. Another quasi-
transformation proposed by Bondarenko et al. (Bon-
darenko et al. 1997) (abstract argumentation-theoretic
approach) lacks a procedure to compute the exten-
sions of the specified default theory. In conclusion,
the transformations mentioned so far have their weak-
nesses. That is the main reason, why we searched
for a translation of propositional default theories into
an assumption-based framework, called argumentation
systems (Kohlas and Monney 1993; Kohlas and Mon-
ney 1995; Kohlas et al. 1998; Haenni 1998; Anrig et al.
1999), to overcome the weaknesses encountered so far.
In argumentation systems all inference is done with-
out leaving the field of classical propositional logic.
Informally speaking, argumentation systems allow to
judge open questions (hypotheses) about the unknown
or future world in the light of the given knowl-
edge. The problem is to determine a set of possi-
ble assumptions that allows to deduce the hypothe-
sis from the given knowledge. Note that the concept
of argumentation systems has many different mean-
ings and we refer to (Chesn˜evar et al. 1998) for
an overview. For instance, the argumentation frame-
work proposed by Prakken (Prakken 1993), which uses
the same terminology as in Bondarenko et al. (Bon-
darenko et al. 1997), is a derivation of Nute’s (Nute
1994) defeasible logic. So, Prakken’s proposal has only
the term argumentation with our approach in com-
mon and it is not an assumption-based framework.
Therefore, we do not make a comparison between
Prakken’s (Prakken 1993) and our approach. But it
is worth noting that Prakken’s proposal is close to
Lukasiewicz’s (Lukasiewicz 1998) approach which ex-
tends still another derivation of Nute’s defeasible logic
with probabilities. Lukasiewicz proposal in turn has
similar properties as the framework proposed by Ben-
ferhat et al. (Benferhat et al. 2000). However, in this
paper the notion of an argumentation system is defined
in Section 4.
In this paper, we present a transformation of Reiter’s
default logic into the framework of argumentation sys-
tems. This transformation is linear in the number of
defaults and allows us to establish a bijection between
extensions of the default theory and some subsets of as-
sumptions of the argumentation system. Moreover, we
provide procedures to answer any query on the speci-
fied default theory.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Sec-
tion 1.2 repeats the necessary basic notions of propo-
sitional logic as a remainder. In Section 2 we briefly
present Reiter’s default logic and introduce the trans-
formation of propositional default theories into associ-
ated propositional argumentation systems. Section 3
discusses the basic elements of propositional argumen-
tation systems. In Section 4 we present the new results
obtained using the transformation mentioned. We con-
clude with an outlook in Sections 5. Proofs of the new
theorems can be found in (Berzati and Anrig 2001).
1.2 PRELIMINARIES
We assume that the reader is familiar with the ba-
sic concepts of propositional logic. We work with the
usual propositional languageLV . That is, LV denotes
set of all formulas which can be formed using the fi-
nite set of propositions V = v1, ..., vn, where as usual,
∧ denotes conjunction, ∨ disjunction, ¬ negation and
→ implication. A literal ℓ ∈ V ± is a proposition or
the negation of a proposition. ⊤ denotes verum and
⊥ falsum. Lower-case Greek letters α, β, . . . denote
formulas and upper-case Greek letters Σ,Ξ, . . . denote
sets of formulas called theories. For a set of formu-
las satisfiability and consistency is defined as usual.
Propositional derivability is denoted by ⊢ and the cor-
responding consequence operator by Th.
For a given a formula φ ∈ LV and a subset of propo-
sitions Q ⊆ V , we are often interested in computing a
formula ψ ∈ LQ such that
(i) φ ⊢ ψ and
(ii) ϕ ∈ LQ and φ ⊢ ϕ imply ψ ⊢ ϕ.
This is the marginalization-problem (Kohlas et al.
1999; Haenni et al. 2000; Haenni and Lehmann 2000;
Kohlas et al. 1998) which is a special case of literal for-
getting (Lin and Reiter 1994) and equivalent to com-
puting prime implicates (Raiman and De Kleer 1992).
A formula ψ which satisfies the two conditions above is
called a marginal of φ with respect to Q ⊆ V , denoted
by φ↓Q. Note that ThLQ(φ
↓Q) = ThLV (φ) ∩LQ. We
will not enter into the details how such a marginal
can be computed. The interested reader is referred for
example to Marquis (Marquis 2000).
Finally, for any set S we denote with |S| the cardinal
number of S, i.e. the number of elements contained in
S, and with 2S the power set of S, i.e. the set of all
subsets of S.
2 DEFAULT LOGIC AND
TRANSLATION
2.1 DEFAULT THEORIES AND
EXTENSIONS
A Reiter’s default theory (Reiter 1980) is a pair 〈Σ,∆〉,
where Σ consists of formulas over a propositional lan-
guage L and ∆ is a set of defaults. A default δ is a
construct of the form1
α : β1, . . . , βk
γ
, where
(i) α, β1, . . . , βk, γ are formulas in L ,
(ii) pre(δ) := {α} is called the prerequisite of the de-
fault δ,
(iii) jus(δ) := {β1, . . . , βk} is called the justification
of the default δ,
(iv) con(δ) := {γ} is called the consequence of the
default δ.
The selectors pre, jus and con are naturally general-
ized to subsets D ⊆ ∆ of defaults:
pre(D) :=
⋃
δ∈D
pre(δ),
jus(D) :=
⋃
δ∈D
jus(δ),
con(D) :=
⋃
δ∈D
con(δ).
Observe that the selectors pre, jus and con, respec-
tively, return sets of formulas of L . It is sometimes
1Note that different defaults have in general a different
number of justifications; yet for the sake of simplicity, we
do not index the k’s in the sequel.
necessary to select the formulas themselves. Thus for
any default δ with k justifications, we define following
selectors:
p(δ) := α, ji(δ) := βi, c(δ) := γ.
〈Σ,∆〉 is called finite if both Σ and ∆ are finite. In
this paper we focus on finite default theories. There-
fore let P = Var(〈Σ,∆〉) denote the set of all proposi-
tions occurring in the formulas of 〈Σ,∆〉 and LP the
propositional language of 〈Σ,∆〉.
The fundamental notion in default logic is the exten-
sion. Intuitively, it denotes the deductive closure of a
maximal set of formulas of 〈Σ,∆〉 containing Σ and
“consistently” adding the consequences of some de-
faults.
Definition 1 (Extension: (Reiter 1980), The-
orem 2.1) A set E ⊆ LP of formulas is called
extension of a default theory 〈Σ,∆〉, where P =
Var(〈Σ,∆〉), iff there exists a sequence E0, E1, . . . such
that
E0 = Σ,
Ej+1 = Th(Ej) ∪ con({δ ∈ ∆ : p(δ) ∈ Ej and
¬ji(δ) /∈ E for every i}),
E =
∞⋃
j=0
Ej .
When we write “for every i” (∀i for short), we mean
for each justification of the respective default.
Example 1 The default theory 〈Σ,∆〉 with Σ = {b→
¬a ∧ ¬c} and ∆ = {⊤:a
a
, ⊤:b
b
, ⊤:c
c
} has two extensions
given by E = Th(Σ ∪ {a, c}), and E′ = Th(Σ ∪ {b}).
Assume that Σ of a given default theory 〈Σ,∆〉 is in-
consistent. Then Th(Σ) is the only extension of 〈Σ,∆〉
which is obviously inconsistent. Therefore, a default
theory is called consistent iff it has at least one con-
sistent extension. In this case Σ must be consistent,
since it is included in every extension. But consistency
of the initial belief does not guarantee that the default
theory has an extension.
Example 2 The default theory 〈Σ,∆〉 with Σ = ∅ and
∆ = {⊤:p
¬p
} has no extension!
Since we are not interested in trivial inconsistent ex-
tensions, we will say that a default theory has no ex-
tension iff the default theory 〈Σ,∆〉 lacks an extension
or Σ is inconsistent.
Default theories 〈Σ,∆〉 lacking an extension should not
be confused with default theories that have a unique
consistent extension which is just the deductive closure
of Σ.
Example 3 Let 〈Σ,∆〉 be a default theory with Σ =
{p, q} and ∆ = { p:¬q
¬q
}. The reader may verify that
E = Th({p, q}) is the only extension.
Two concepts of consequence are of main interested
when working with default theories:
Definition 2 A formula φ is called credulous conse-
quence of a default theory 〈Σ,∆〉 iff it belongs to at
least one extension, and skeptical consequence iff it
belongs to all extensions.
2.2 EMBEDDING GENERAL DEFAULT
THEORIES
Let 〈Σ,∆〉 be a default theory with formulas in LP ,
where P = Var(〈Σ,∆〉). For any default δ ∈ ∆ con-
sider the following transformation t:
t(δ) ={apδ → ¬p(δ)} ∪
{ajδ,i → ji(δ) : i = 1, . . . , |jus(δ)|} ∪
{acδ → c(δ)}. (1)
We call the triple 〈apδ, {a
j
δ,i : i = 1, . . . , |jus(δ)|}, a
c
δ〉
default assumption and denote it by aδ. Moreover, let
A∆ = {〈a
p
δ, {a
j
δ,i : i = 1, . . . , |jus(δ)|}, a
c
δ〉 : δ ∈ ∆}
denote the set of default assumptions. Often, we will
look at indexed defaults δj and abbreviate the de-
fault assumption aδj by aj . For a default assumption
〈apδ, {a
j
δ,i : i = 1, . . . , |jus(δ)|}, a
c
δ〉 ∈ A∆ we call a
p
δ
prerequisitional, ajδ,i justificational (∀i), and a
c
δ conse-
quential assumption. The sets Ap = {a
p
δ : δ ∈ ∆},
Aj = {a
j
δ,i : δ ∈ ∆, i = 1, . . . , |jus(δ)|} and finally
Ac = {acδ : δ ∈ ∆} denote the corresponding sets of
prerequisitional, justificational, and consequential as-
sumption, respectively. The set
A = Ap ∪ Aj ∪ Ac, which consists of pairwise distinct
propositions such that A ∩ P = ∅, is called the set of
assumptions. The pair
〈Ξ, A〉, were Ξ = Σ ∪
⋃
δ∈∆
t(δ), (2)
is called the (propositional) argumentation system as-
sociated with the default theory 〈Σ,∆〉 (cf. Section 3).
Example 4 Let 〈Σ,∆〉 = 〈{e ∨ o}, { e:r
r
, o:r
r
}〉 be a
default theory, then the corresponding argumentation
system is 〈Ξ, A〉 = 〈{e ∨ o, ap1 → ¬e, a
j
1 → r, a
c
1 →
r, a
p
2 → ¬o, a
j
2 → r, a
c
2 → r}, {a
p
1, a
p
2, a
j
1, a
j
2, a
c
1, a
c
2}〉,
where the set of default assumptions is A∆ =
{〈ap1, {a
j
1}, a
c
1〉, 〈a
p
2, {a
j
2}, a
c
2〉}.
Any subset α ⊆ Ac is called consequential term. Con-
sequential terms will allow us, using the framework of
propositional argumentation systems, to decide wether
a given default theory has extensions, characterize all
extensions, and wether a given formula is a skeptical
or credulous consequence of the default theory.
3 PROPOSITIONAL
ARGUMENTATION SYSTEMS
The major difference between argumentation sys-
tems (Haenni et al. 2000; Anrig 2000) and other non-
monotonic formalisms (Reiter 1980; McCarthy 1980;
Moore 1985) is that in argumentation systems, all the
inference is done with classical propositional logic.
Consider a propositional theory Ξ with formulas in
LV , where V = {v1, v2, . . . , vm}. From V we choose
a finite subset A ⊆ V whose members are called as-
sumptions. The other propositions in P = V − A are
called non-assumables. For convenience, we enumer-
ate the assumptions, i.e. A = {a1, . . . , an}. The pair
〈Ξ, A〉 is called a (propositional) argumentation system
and Ξ is said to be an argumentation theory. So we
consider a fixed argumentation system 〈Ξ, A〉, with ⊢
as the derivability relation and Th the corresponding
closure operator. Note that the case where A = ∅,
corresponds to the usual propositional theory.
In an argumentation system 〈Ξ, A〉, the assumptions
A = {a1, . . . , an} of the argumentation theory Ξ are
essential for expressing uncertain information. They
represent uncertain events, unknown circumstances, or
possible risks and outcomes. Formally, this is defined
as follows:
Definition 3 A term α is a subset of literals from
A±, so that if ℓ ∈ α, then ¬ℓ /∈ α. The set of all terms
is denoted by TA.
The non-assumables appearing in Ξ are treated as
classical propositions for the given argumentation the-
ory Ξ.
Definition 4 A term α ∈ TA is called inconsistent
relative to Ξ iff α∪Ξ is unsatisfiable. I(Ξ) denotes the
set of inconsistent terms relative to Ξ. An inconsistent
term α is called minimal iff no proper subset of α is
inconsistent relative to Ξ. µI(Ξ) denotes the set of all
minimal inconsistent terms relative to Ξ, and is called
the set of minimal contradictions.
In the sequel we will write α,Ξ ⊢ ⊥ to indicate that α
is inconsistent, and α,Ξ 0 ⊥ to indicate that α is
not inconsistent (relative to Ξ). Th(α,Ξ) denotes the
deductive closure of α ∪ Ξ, and α,Ξ ⊢ ψ is an ab-
breviation for α ∪ Ξ ⊢ ψ. With this notation the
set of minimal contradictions can be represented by
µI(Ξ) = µ{α ∈ TA : α,Ξ ⊢ ⊥}.
Example 5 Let 〈Ξ, A〉 be an argumentation system,
where Ξ = {a1 → p, a2 → q,¬p,¬q} is the argumenta-
tion theory and A = {a1, a2} the set of assumptions.
Then µI(Ξ) = {{a1}, {a2}} is the set of minimal con-
tradictions.
An argumentation system 〈Ξ, A〉 allows to reason
about a specified propositional formula φ ∈ LV , called
hypothesis, with respect to A. The idea is to consider
terms α which together with the argumentation theory
Ξ imply this hypothesis φ.
Definition 5 ((Haenni et al. 2000), Theorem
2.7) Let 〈Ξ, A〉 be an argumentation system. A term
α is called a supporting argument for φ iff α,Ξ ⊢ φ
and α′,Ξ 0 ⊥ for all α′ ∈ TA such that α ⊆ α′.
sp(φ; Ξ) = {α∈TA : α,Ξ⊢φ and α′,Ξ0⊥ for all α′ ∈
TA such that α ⊆ α′} denotes the corresponding set of
supporting arguments. A supporting argument α for
a hypothesis φ describes an environment in which the
hypothesis is a logical consequence of the given argu-
mentation theory, hence necessarily true. Moreover,
extending this environment in such a way that α is
still the case, does not lead to inconsistencies. For a
general discussion of the requirement that α′,Ξ 0 ⊥
for all α′ ∈ TA such that α ⊆ α′ we refer to (Kohlas
et al. 2002).
Example 6 Let Ξ = {a1 → p, a2 → q, p → ¬q}
and A = {a1, a2}. The supporting arguments for p
are sp(p; Ξ) = {{a1,¬a2}}. Note that {a1},Ξ ⊢ p
and {a1},Ξ 0 ⊥, but {a1, a2},Ξ ⊢ ⊥, hence {a1} is
not a supporting argument for p. Similarly, we get
sp(q; Ξ) = {{¬a1, a2}}.
Definition 6 Let 〈Ξ, A〉 be an argumentation system,
α a term, and A ⊆ A± a set of literals. The pair
〈α,A〉 is called structure iff
(i) α,Ξ 0 ⊥, and
(ii) {ℓ} ∪ α,Ξ 0 ⊥, for every ℓ ∈ A.
α is called the anchor and A the set of irrelevant literals
of 〈α,A〉 w.r.t. Ξ.
Note that {ℓ} ∪ α,Ξ 0 ⊥ for every ℓ ∈ A does not
guarantee that {ℓi, ℓj} ∪ α,Ξ 0 ⊥ for ℓi, ℓj ∈ A and
i 6= j. The utility of structures will become clear in
Section 4.
We close our discussion of terms and scenarios and re-
fer to (Haenni et al. 2000; Kohlas and Monney 1995;
Kohlas et al. 1998; Kohlas and Monney 1993; An-
rig et al. 1999; Haenni 1998; Haenni and Lehmann
2000) for readers wishing more details concerning this
issue. For computational purposes, especially comput-
ing minimal contradictions and approximation tech-
niques see (Haenni et al. 2000; Haenni 2001a).
4 EXTENSIONS AND TERMS
Here, we characterize extensions in the correspond-
ing propositional argumentation system using struc-
tures 〈α,A〉 (cf. Definition 6), and provide, based on
the anchor of some structures, an inductive procedure
to compute extensions, if the original default theory
has any. Here, only consequential terms (cf. Sec-
tion 2.2) are allowed as anchor α, i.e. α ⊆ Ac and
the set of irrelevant literals A consists only of justi-
ficational assumptions, i.e. A ⊆ Aj. What follows is
close in spirit to Lukaszewicz’s (Lukaszewicz 1991) se-
mantics for Reiter’s default logic.
A pair 〈α,A〉, where α ⊆ Ac is a consequential term
and A ⊆ Aj is a set of justificational assumptions is
called consequence-justification pair, CJ-pair for short.
Definition 7 Let 〈Σ,∆〉 be default theory, 〈Ξ, A〉 its
corresponding argumentation system, α ⊆ Ac a conse-
quential term and a = 〈ap, {aj1, . . . , a
j
k}, a
c〉 a default
assumption. We say that a is applicable with respect
to α iff
(i) {ap} ∪ α ∈ I(Ξ) and
(ii) {aji} ∪ α /∈ I(Ξ) for i = 1, . . . , k.
Note that we do not check if {ac}∪α,Ξ ⊢ ⊥. The idea
is to obtain a sequence of consequences to add succes-
sively to the consequential term according to Defini-
tion 1 in an argumentation system.
Definition 8 To each default assumption a =
〈ap, {aj1, . . . , a
j
k}, a
c〉 we assign a mapping, denoted by
a≺, from CJ-pairs into CJ-pairs specified by
(i) a≺(〈α,A〉) = 〈{ac} ∪ α, {aj1, . . . , a
j
k} ∪
A〉, if 〈α,A〉 is a structure and a is ap-
plicable w.r.t. α;
(ii) a≺(〈α,A〉) = 〈α,A〉, if 〈α,A〉 is a struc-
ture and a is not applicable w.r.t. α;
(iiii) a≺(〈α,A〉) = 〈{⊥}, ∅〉, otherwise.
If a default assumption is applicable with respect to
some consequential term, then we have to include its
consequential assumption to the already given conse-
quential term. But this inclusion may lead to inconsis-
tencies. Consequently, we have to check if the obtained
CJ–pair is still a structure.
Example 7 Consider 〈{p}, { p:q
¬q
}〉 with Ξ = {p, ap →
¬p, aj → q, ac → ¬q}. If we take the structure
〈{⊤}, ∅〉, then a = 〈ap, {aj}, ac〉 is applicable w.r.t.
{⊤}. Thus a≺(〈{⊤}, ∅〉) = 〈{ac}, {aj}〉, but {aj} ∪
{ac},Ξ ⊢ ⊥, hence 〈{ac}, {aj}〉 is not a structure.
Definition 9 A structure 〈α,A〉 is called accessible
(with respect to A∆) iff there is a sequence 〈aj〉 =
〈a1, a2, . . . , aq〉 of non–repeating default assumptions
such that
(i) 〈α0,A0〉 = 〈{⊤}, ∅〉;
(ii) aj is applicable w.r.t. αj−1 and
〈αj ,Aj〉 = a
≺
j (〈αj−1,Aj−1〉) for
j = 1, 2, . . . , q;
(iii) 〈αq,Aq〉 = 〈α,A〉
(iv) there is no default assumption ai ∈ A∆
which is applicable w.r.t. α but not in-
cluded in 〈aj〉.
Such a 〈aj〉 is called a generating sequence of 〈α,A〉.
If 〈aj〉 is a generating sequence of a structure 〈α,A〉,
then α contains all consequential assumptions of the
default assumptions appearing in 〈aj〉, A contains the
union of all sets of justificational assumptions of the
default assumptions appearing in 〈aj〉, and 〈α,A〉 is
still a structure. In particular α ⊆ Ac.
Example 8 Consider the default theory
〈∅, {⊤:p
p
, ⊤:q
q
}〉 with corresponding Ξ = {¬ap1, a
j
1 →
p, ac1 → p,¬a
p
2, a
j
2 → q, a
c
2 → q}. If we take the struc-
ture 〈{⊤}, ∅〉, then 〈a1, a2〉 and 〈a2, a1〉 are generating
sequences of the same structure 〈{ac1, a
c
2}, {a
j
1, a
j
2}〉.
Obviously, there may be different generating sequences
for the same structure. But two generating sequences
of the same structure contain the same default assump-
tions, i.e. one is a permutation of the other (Berzati
and Anrig 2001).
The definition of accessible structures is justified by
the next theorem, which can be regarded as the dual
result of Theorem 5.63 in (Lukaszewicz 1991). Duality
in the sense that Lukaszewicz’ (Lukaszewicz 1991) the-
orem is a semantic characterization of extensions and
our result is a syntactic characterization of extensions.
In fact the proof follows Lukaszewicz (Lukaszewicz
1991).
Theorem 1 (Berzati and Anrig 2001) Let 〈Σ,∆〉
be a default theory and 〈Ξ, A〉 the corresponding argu-
mentation system. There is a bijection between acces-
sible structures of 〈Ξ, A〉 and consistent extensions of
〈Σ,∆〉.
The theorem above states only that an accessible
structure contains the information concerning some
corresponding extension of the given default theory
〈Σ,∆〉. It says nothing about how the extension can
be characterized. This observation motivates our next
definition to simplify terminology.
Definition 10 The anchor α of an accessible struc-
ture 〈α,A〉 is called default term. The set of all default
terms is denoted by dt(Ξ).
The notion of a default term permits to derive some
corollaries of Theorem 1.
Corollary 1 (Berzati and Anrig 2001) Let 〈Σ,∆〉
be a default theory with P = Var(〈Σ,∆〉) and 〈Ξ, A〉
the corresponding argumentation system.
(i) Σ is inconsistent iff µI(Ξ) = {{⊤}}.
(ii) 〈Σ,∆〉 has no extension iff dt(Ξ) = ∅
and µI(Ξ) 6= {{⊤}}.
(iii) E = Th(Σ) is the only extension iff
dt(Ξ) = {⊤}.
(iv) E = Th((α,Ξ)↓P ) is an extension of
〈Σ,∆〉 iff α ∈ dt(Ξ).
Now, that we have a complete characterization of ex-
tensions for a given default theory 〈Σ,∆〉 in terms of
the default terms dt(Ξ) ⊆ 2Ac of the corresponding
argumentation system 〈Ξ, A〉, it remains to determine
how those default terms can be computed. Interest-
ingly, all we need to do that are the minimal contra-
dictions µI(Ξ). The minimal contradictions µI(Ξ) are
known to play a central role in argumentation sys-
tems, for example for computing supporting scenar-
ios (Haenni et al. 2000) and in model-based diagnos-
tics and reliability (Anrig and Kohlas 2002). Therefore
a lot of effort has been made to develop efficient algo-
rithms (Haenni et al. 2000; Haenni 2001b) to compute
µI(Ξ). So default logic can profit from those efforts.
Theorem 2 (Berzati and Anrig 2001) Let 〈Σ,∆〉
be a default theory and 〈Ξ, A〉 the corresponding argu-
mentation system. A term α ⊆ Ac different from {⊤}
is a default term iff there is an enumeration ac1, . . . , a
c
q
of the consequential assumptions acj ∈ α such that
(i) {ap1} ∈ I(Ξ),
(ii) For every j = 1, . . . , q − 1 we have
{apj+1} ∪ {a
c
1, . . . , a
c
j} ∈ I(Ξ),
(iii) For every j = 1, . . . , q and every i we
have {ajji} ∪ α /∈ I(Ξ),
(iv) For every a
p
l ∈ (Ap − {a
p
1, . . . , a
p
q}) we
have
(a) {apl } ∪ α /∈ I(Ξ), or
(b) {ajli} ∪ α ∈ I(Ξ) for some i.
Note that if α ∈ µI(Ξ), then any term α′, such that
α ⊆ α′, is inconsistent, i.e. α′ ∈ I(Ξ). Clearly, only
the minimal contradictions µI(Ξ) will be computed.
Theorem 2 indicates an iterative procedure for com-
puting default terms given the translation of the de-
fault theory and the respective minimal contradictions.
The following examples shows how.
Example 9 We consider for each case of Corollary 1
a small example.
• For 〈Σ,∆〉 = 〈{p,¬p}, { p:q
q
}〉, t(〈Σ,∆〉) =
〈{p,¬p, ap → ¬p, aj → q, ac → q}, {ap, aj, ac}〉
and µI(Ξ) = {{⊤}}. Clearly, Σ ⊢ ⊥.
• For 〈Σ,∆〉 = 〈∅, {⊤:¬p
p
}〉 we have t(〈Σ,∆〉) =
〈{¬ap, aj → ¬p, ac → p}, {ap, aj, ac}〉 and
µI(Ξ) = {{ap}, {ac, aj}}. The only potentially
possible default term different from {⊤} is {ac}.
{ap} ∈ µI(Ξ), so point (i) of Theorem 2 is fulfilled.
But {ac, aj} ∈ µI(Ξ), thus (iii) of Theorem 2 is
violated, thus {ac} is no default term. Hence we
conclude that there is no default term and 〈Σ,∆〉
has no extension.
• For 〈Σ,∆〉 = 〈{e∨ o}, { e:r
r
}〉 we have t(〈Σ,∆〉) =
〈{e ∨ o, ap → ¬e, aj → r, ac → r}, {ap, aj, ac}〉
and µI(Ξ) = {{⊥}}. As {ap} /∈ µI(Ξ) (point (i)),
there is no default term different from {⊤} Indeed,
this default theory has a single extension given by
E = Th({e ∨ o}).
• Finally, for 〈Σ,∆〉 = 〈∅, {⊤:c
¬d
, ⊤:d
¬e
, ⊤:e
¬f
}〉 we
have Ξ = {¬ap1, a
j
1 → c, a
c
1 → ¬d,¬a
p
2, a
j
2 →
d, ac2 → ¬e,¬a
p
3, a
j
3 → e, a
c
3 → ¬f} and µI(Ξ) =
{{ap1}, {a
p
2}, {a
p
3}, {a
c
1, a
j
2}, {a
c
2, a
j
3}}. There are
three prerequisitional assumptions to start with:
– First we start with {ap1}. The hypothesis
that {ac1} is a default term is rejected, since
{ap3} ∈ µI(Ξ)(point (a) of (iv) is violated).
Thus {ac1, a
c
3} could be a default term. And
indeed {ac1, a
c
3} is a default term, as (i) to (iv)
is satisfied.
– Second we start with {ap2}. The hypothe-
sis that {ac2} is a default term is rejected,
since {ap1} ∈ µI(Ξ)(point (a) of (iv) is vio-
lated). Thus {ac2, a
c
1} could be a default term.
But {ac2, a
c
1} being a default term must be re-
jected, since {ac1, a
j
2} ∈ µI(Ξ) (point (iii) is
violated).
– Finally we start with {ap3}. We already know
that {ac1, a
c
3} is a default term. Thus we
have to test if {ac3, a
c
2} is a default term, as
{ap2} ∈ µI(Ξ) ({a
c
3} being a default term vi-
olates point (a) of (iv)). Since {ac2, a
j
3} ∈
µI(Ξ), the hypothesis {ac3, a
c
2} being a default
term is rejected (point (iii) is violated).
So, Th({¬d,¬f}) is the only extension of this de-
fault theory.
We need some notation to answer the question which
formulas φ ∈ LP are provable in a default theory
〈Σ,∆〉, where P = Var(〈Σ,∆〉). For a supporting ar-
gument α ∈ sp(φ; Ξ) we define α+ = α ∩ A (i.e. we
forget all literals ℓ ∈ α such that ℓ = ¬ai and ai ∈ A).
Theorem 3 (Berzati and Anrig 2001) Let 〈Σ,∆〉
be a default theory, 〈Ξ, A〉 the corresponding argu-
mentation system, and φ ∈ LP a formula, where
P = Var(〈Σ,∆〉).
(i) φ is a credulous consequence of 〈Σ,∆〉 iff
{α+ : α ∈ sp(φ; Ξ)} ∩ dt(Ξ) 6= ∅;
(ii) φ is a skeptical consequence of 〈Σ,∆〉 iff
dt(Ξ) ⊆ {α+ : α ∈ sp(φ; Ξ)}.
Example 10 The default theory 〈Σ,∆〉, where Σ =
{b → d, c → d} and ∆ = {⊤:¬c
b
, ⊤:¬b
c
} has two exten-
sions E1 = Th({b, d}) and E2 = Th({c, d}). Clearly,
b and c are credulous consequences of 〈Σ,∆〉, whereas
b∨c and d are skeptical consequences. The translation
returns 〈Ξ, A〉 with Ξ = {b→ d, c→ d,¬ap1,¬a
p
2, a
j
1 →
¬c, aj2 → ¬b, a
c
1 → b, a
c
2 → c}. One can verify that
dt(Ξ) = {{ac1}, {a
c
2}}, {α
+ : α ∈ sp(b; Ξ)} = {{ac1}},
{α+ : α ∈ sp(c; Ξ)} = {{ac2}} and {α
+ : α ∈
sp(b ∨ c; Ξ)} = {α+ : α ∈ sp(d; Ξ)} = {{ac1}, {a
c
2}}.
5 CONCLUSION
We have provided a translation from default theories
into argumentation systems which is linear in the num-
ber of defaults, from which we can decide if the given
default theory has no extensions and if it has consistent
extensions. Moreover, we are able to characterize all
extensions, without leaving the monotone framework
of propositional logic. All we need are assumptions.
Finally, for any given formula we can decide if it is a
skeptical or credulous consequence of the original de-
fault theory.
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